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complete determination of any cause. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE THE STATE NOW CONCEDES THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
MADE FINDINGS WHICH WERE "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS" AND WHICH 
WERE "AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE," AND 
BECAUSE THE STATE NOW CONCEDES THAT COMMISSIONER 
GALLIAN'S LAWFIRM HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND THAT ITS 
NAMED COUNSEL, J. MACARTHUR WRIGHT "RAN AFOUL OF BROWN," 
APPELLANT DOES NOT REARGUE THOSE POINTS HERE 
The State has conceded that (a) The District Court erred in 
imputing only a landlord-tenant relationship between Commissioner 
Gallian's lawfirm and Defense Counsel; (b) Gallian's conflicts of 
interest must be imputed to defense counsel J. MacArthur Wright, 
and (c) Mr. Wright "ran afoul of Brown." The State now confesses 
reversible error as to a Brown conflict. Appellant does not 
reargue those points. 
POINT II 
THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY IS FOR THE UTAH SUPREME COURT TO 
DISMISS APPELLANT'S CONVICTION, ON THE MERITS AND WITH 
PREJUDICE. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS THAT AUTHORITY. 
IF THE SUPREME COURT WILL NOT SO DISMISS THEN RATHER THAN 
VACATE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IT SHOULD RESERVE TO HER 
THE ELECTION OF PLEA WITHDRAWAL OR HOLDING THE STATE TO 
ITS BARGAIN. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ALSO MANDATE THAT 
IF APPELLANT DOES ELECT TO WITHDRAW HER PLEA THAT SHE 
CANNOT BE CHARGED OR SENTENCED MORE SEVERELY THAN SHE WAS 
BEFORE SHE BROUGHT THIS APPEAL AND CHALLENGED WASHINGTON 
COUNTY'S ONGOING PRACTICES WHICH DENIED TO HER THOSE 
GUARANTEED AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF EFFECTIVE AND WHOLLY 
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL. 
Appellant does NOT submit that the appropriate remedy of 
Washington County's open and knowing and ongoing contempt for the 
Utah Supreme Court's mandate in Brown is Vacation of Ms. Swanson's 
conviction and remand of her case to a hostile and vindictive re-
prosecution in Washington County. The State suggests in its 
"confession" of error that "Vacation" is appropriate. Appellant 
disagrees. The proper remedy is dismissal of the conviction, by 
the Utah Supreme Court, under its inherent and supervisory powers, 
as articulated in UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. VIII §2: "The Supreme 
Court by rule may sit and render final judgment either en banc or 
in divisions...." Further, the Court may dismiss as a sanction 
for the prosecution's knowing maintenance of an inherent and 
ongoing scheme of public defender selection and retention which 
created an blatant and perpetual conflict of interest even well 
after Brown was published and brought to the prosecution's 
attention. Even then the prosecution and other players in the 
Washington County justice system were not only indifferent but upon 
being advised that its public defenders ran afoul of Brown,'became 
wholly resistant to coming into compliance with Brown and took a 
hostile and vindictive approach toward Ms. Swanson. 
Finally, either appellate court has power to dismiss under 
Rule 30(b), U.R.App.P.: If a judgment of conviction is reversed, 
a new trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court 
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(Emphasis added). Clearly, appellate court remand for a new 
trial is not mandated anywhere. To the contrary, it is but one 
option among many. See also Rule 25(a), U.R.Crim.P., "Dismissal 
without trial11 for further authority. Surely ART VIII §1 does not 
give the Utah Supreme Court less power than it does a district 
court; nor do §§2, 3, or 4 of ART. VIII. 
If the Court elects not to dismiss with prejudice and on the 
merits, then the proper alternative is to remand the case to a new 
district court judge in the Third District or some other 
jurisdiction, away from the mischief of cliquish, inbred rural 
systems of "justice" for further proceedings, and through a new and 
untainted prosecutor, with Ms. Swanson having the election of (a) 
keeping her original plea bargain after being fully advised by 
conflict-free counsel, or (b) withdrawing her plea and proceeding 
to trial. Again, the Supreme Court has those powers under ART. 
VIII §§2 & 3, as well as under §4, which is the authority cited in 
Brown, and in Barnard v. Sutliff, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (1992). 
Further, Washington County prosecutors should be restrained from 
exerting any pressure on the new prosecutor to be vindictive in any 
way or to treat Ms. Swanson differently than any other accused 
person in her situation. Ms. Swanson should not be punished for 
exercising her inherent and inalienable rights including those 
found in UTAH CONSTITUTION ART I §1, which include "...protest 
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against wrongs and petition for redress of grievances." See also 
amend 1, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Ms. Swanson should not be punished for exercising her 
constitutional rights to conflict-free and competent legal counsel, 
as guaranteed by Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1 and the Utah and United 
States Constitutional provisions cited above. Accordingly, if 
remanded, this Court or the Utah Supreme Court should expressly 
limit the scope and maximum punishment of Ms. Swanson on re-trial, 
if any, to not exceed that of her earlier conviction, including a 
ceiling of 30 days incarceration. Good public policy supports the 
proposition that a defendant in a criminal case should not put 
herself at risk because she has through courage, successfully 
challenged an illegal status quo scheme, and helped to reform the 
local justice system which so abused her ab initio. Further, cases 
such as State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991), cert, den. 116 
L.Ed.2d 787, 112 S.Ct. 883 (1992) appear to support the principle. 
But the better remedy, for purposes of finality, deterrence, 
judicial economy, and equity, and justice, is simple and immediate 
dismissal by the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to any of several 
bases set forth above. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S NEW COUNSEL IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES; 
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THE COURT HAS POWER TO ORDER THEM; IT WAS WHOLLY 
IMPOSSIBLE AND IMPRACTICAL FOR APPELLANT TO HAVE OBTAINED 
ANY WHOLLY INDEPENDENT LEGAL COUNSEL IN WASHINGTON COUNTY 
PRIOR TO HER APPEAL EXCEPT FOR "WHITE KNIGHT" ASSISTANCE. 
Appellant adopts, ratifies, and incorporates herein the 
arguments made in the Reply Brief of Amicus regarding attorneys 
fees. 
It seems preposterous and inequitable to assert that those 
whom the State admits acted unlawfully and unethically may be paid 
for their knowing and wilful disregard of the Utah Supreme Courts 
own mandate in Brown, yet a "white knight" must go uncompensated 
for efforts which have concededly improved the delivery of justice 
on a macro scale as well as in the specific case of Sonja Swanson, 
an indigent with no other choice or recourse except for a "white 
knight". Such is not only inequitable but is wholly "Through the 
Looking Glass" backward, illogical and legally topsy-turvy, and 
should be declared unlawful here. Further, such approach strains 
if not snaps the tenuous grip defendants should have on 
Constitutionally guaranteed rights to effective and conflict-free 
counsel. 
Appellant also takes strong issue with the State's position in 
its brief that Ms. Swanson has apparently abandoned the argument 
[that the State acted in bad faith]. (Br. State 17). Neither her 
initial Brief nor this Reply Brief understates Appellant's 
conviction that the State, among others, acted in bad faith in its 
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callous and concerted effort to deny Ms. Swanson conflict-free and 
effective trial counsel, nor that it reached to absurd lengths at 
the trial court level in an effort to support findings contrary to 
fact, law, and common sense. If this argument appears to be 
"abandoned" then Appellant's briefs have only been half read. 
Appellant further contests the State's suggestion at Br.State 
19 that the State had "contracted with Doug Terry to handle cases 
in which MacArthur Wright has a conflict." Besides begging the 
question as to how Ms. Swanson was expected to raise the issue 
herself, when her own attorney resisted the proposition that he had 
a conflict, the fact is that Doug Terry also made it clear in 
writing and at the time that Mr. Wright had no conflict of interest 
either. 
In support of the above proposition, Appellant submits as 
Attachment I, incorporated herein and made a part hereof, to wit: 
a letter dated March 4, 1993 from civil rights attorney Brian 
Barnard to the Washington County Commissioners, including 
Commissioner Gallian, with copies to all three Washington County 
Public Defenders, to wit:; MacArthur Wright, his son Jonathan 
Wright, and aforementioned Douglas Terry. The Bernard letter was 
faxed the very day new counsel first appeared, and two days before 
Ms. Swanson was to begin serving her jail term. Mr. Barnard's 
letter specifically addresses the conflicts raised in Brown. 
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The very next day the above-mentioned Doug Terry hand-
delivered to current counsel for Appellant, and sent to all others 
on the mailing list of the March 4, 1993 Barnard letter, his strong 
reply to the same Barnard letter. This letter from Doug Terry, 
dated March 5, 1993, is incorporated herein and made a part hereof 
as "Attachment II." In pertinent part the Terry letter states that 
I take personal offense at Mr. Barnard's implied 
accusations that either myself... or J. MacArthur Wright 
have in anyway (sic) acted otherwise [than providing all 
appointed clients with more than constitutionally 
guaranteed representation]. 
It is wholly impractical and absurd to suppose that under the 
circumstances then existing that Sonja Swanson had any chance 
whatsoever in being appointed a conflict-free public defender, 
particularly before her immediate date with the illegally 
overcrowded Washington County Jail, and particularly in light of 
the District Court's extreme measures in making those findings 
which even the State conceded in Point I-A of its brief were 
"clearly erroneous (Br. State 13) and which were "against the clear 
weight of the evidence" (Br. State 14). 
In its argument, the State attempts to point out technical 
reasons why attorneys fees were allegedly not sought or preserved 
by, or available to, Defendant under the facts of this case. 
In fact, Defendant did preserve his right to seek attorneys 
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fees on appeal. See Mar. 12 Tr. 7:2-3: 
But I donft want to waive any right to recover 
anything under the appropriate circumstances. 
This preservation was made in response to the Court's restricted 
inquiry as to whether Mr. Huntsman was acting as "retained counsel 
or as pro bono counsel." Id. at 6:22-24. The Court appeared to 
frame the question in a way which precluded any other alternative. 
There are other alternatives, and it was these alternatives 
Defense Counsel had in mind when making the record, as cited above. 
One such alternative, consistent with the Supreme Court's inherent 
powers as spelled out in Brown, and §§2, 3, and 4 of ART. VIII, 
would be for the Court to exercise its equitable powers and/or its 
supervisory powers, in extraordinary cases, and award attorney fees 
in "White Knight" cases such as this, where realistic alternatives 
to preserve Ms. Swanson's rights under amends 6 and 14 of the 
United States Constitution and Art I §§7 and 12 of the Utah 
Constitution simply did not exist nor were permitted to exist. 
Several states have, through precedent, not statute, permitted 
such fees under a variety of names, including the "private attorney 
general" theory, "common fund" theory, or "common benefit" theory. 
The instant case is intended to provide a common benefit for those 
whom the system callously derails. 
In the case of Deras v. Meyers 535 P.2d 541 (Ore. 1975), a 
candidate for state office was awarded attorney fees in prevailing 
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on an attempted denial of a state constitutional right. The Oregon 
court stated that Deras1 victory benefitted "all members of the 
public" by enforcing "the interest of the public in preservation of 
the individual liberties guaranteed against governmental 
infringement of the constitution." Xd at 550. 
The State of Washington, likewise, recognizes four separate 
equitable grounds upon which an award of attorneys fees may be 
made, even in the absence of statutory authorization or contract. 
These grounds include (1) bad faith conduct of the losing party; 
(2) preservation of a common fund; (3) protection of constitutional 
principles; and (4) private attorney general actions. See, e.g., 
Public Utility Dist. lv. Kottside, 545 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1976) ; Miotke 
v. Spokane, 678 P.2d 803 (Wash. 1984). 
Other states which value their citizens1 constitutional rights 
with similar precedent include California, Alaska, and Idaho, among 
others. 
Most cases authorizing an equitable basis for attorneys fees 
require that there exist a large number of people benefiting from 
the action, or that a substantial constitutional right be affected, 
or that the state is acting in bad faith, and/or that private 
enforcement is necessary. 
Clearly a substantial constitutional right is at issue here. 
There is no question that Defendant will not be and has not been 
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the only person treated so contemptuously by the criminal justice 
system in Washington County. Defendant believes that the record is 
clear, that the state at the trial level acted in bad faith, and 
denied her a fundamental constitutional right, and that through her 
challenge many others will benefit and the system of justice will 
be improved. Defendant has also demonstrated, on the record, that 
but-for the "white-knight11 intervention no protection whatsoever 
would have occurred to her fundamental trial rights. 
As to the numerous "Catch 22" blocks to any meaningful 
representation being available to Ms. Swanson in the environment 
existing then and there, Appellant respectfully refers the Court to 
the excellent Reply Brief of Amicus. In short, there was not and 
is not any real-world, meaningful opportunity for Ms. Swanson to 
have obtained conflict-free counsel but for the intervention of 
"white knight" counsel. That such a situation is allowed to exist 
neither deters prosecutorial or other misconduct or speaks well of 
the failure of our citizens1 government to protect their 
Constitutionally based liberties and protections, which are 
supposedly guaranteed by that government. The Utah Supreme Court 
has the inherent powers found in ART VIII §§2, 3, and 4, in 
addition to the several theories raised and preserved by Appellant, 
to correct that injustice, and it should do so by awarding 
attorneys fees to Appellant. 
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POINT IV 
"SUGGESTION FOR TRANSFER OF APPEAL TO THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT" WAS FILED ON AUGUST 5, 1993, AND SHOULD BE GRANTED 
NOW THAT BRIEFING IS COMPLETED. 
The issues raised above require that the Supreme Court of Utah 
exercise its inherent and supervisory powers under the Constitution 
of the State of Utah, as cited above. 
Appellant has already filed, on August 5, 1993, a "Suggestion 
for Transfer of Appeal to Utah Supreme Court" [Attachment 3 is 
copy of same]. On November 3, 1993, Hon. Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge of the Utah Court of Appeals, Ordered that "a 
ruling on the suggestion for transfer [be] deferred pending 
completion of briefing of the case". See Attachment 4, Order, 
incorporated herein and made a part hereof. 
Briefing is now completed, and Appellant now respectfully 
requests that this transfer be made to the Utah Supreme Court for 
argument and ruling. 
POINT V 
BECAUSE OF PROFESSED CONFUSION SURROUNDING, AND OPEN 
DEFIANCE OF, THE SUPREME COURT'S EARLIER BROWN MANDATES, 
"BRIGHT LINE" GENERAL ORDER BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IS 
NECESSARY TO CLARIFY THE SCOPE OF BROWN AND, MORE 
IMPORTANTLY, TO MEANINGFULLY DETER ITS WANTON DISREGARD 
BY INBRED, CONFLICT-RIDDEN LOCAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS. 
The scope of Brown needs to be clearly articulated by the Utah 
11 
Supreme Court. Even so, the Utah Supreme Court's existing mandates 
in Brown, which are directed to public defenders, counties, 
prosecutors, and local government officials, are all too often 
ignored or treated with contempt by those whose duty it is to 
assure its compliance. And why should cynical and conviction-
driven justice systems "do the right thing" by obeying a Supreme 
Court mandate when no risk whatsoever attaches to its blatant 
disregard? Mere reversal and remand is no more of a meaningful 
deterrent to official lawlessness than is Brer Fox's remanding Brer 
Rabbit back to the Briar Patch. 
Accordingly, a bright-line Order should specify meaningful 
remedies, with "teeth", such as dismissal of charges with 
prejudice, and on the merits; attorneys fees for "white knight" 
lawyers who provide the only meaningful alternatives to conflict-
ridden public defenders, and other remedies which will make 
prosecutorial mischief truly risky to the State, not to an already 
victimized supplicant. 
The bright-line Order should also promulgate a rule forbidding 
any government attorneys and/or their associates from criminal 
representation. Opinion No. 126 of the Ethics Advisory Opinion 
Committee of the Utah State Bar, which the State refers to in Br. 
State 23, should be integrated into an Order, so that its 
precedential effect and use at trial is not at risk of being deemed 
12 
tangential or irrelevant as "only11 an "ethical opinion." 
POINT VI 
WHERE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE ARGUMENTS IN AND THRUST 
OF APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, APPELLANT RESPECTFULLY 
RATIFIES AS ITS OWN, AND INCORPORATES HEREIN, THE REPLY 
BRIEF OF AMICUS. 
As to all other arguments and articulations in the Reply Brief 
of Amicus where not inconsistent with Appellant's Reply Brief here, 
Appellant hereby ratifies and incorporates same as if same were 
part of her own Reply Brief here. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully refers this Court to her August 5, 1993 
"Suggestion for Transfer of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court." 
Upon such transfer, the Supreme Court is respectfully requested to 
assert its inherent and supervisory powers and authority—as it did 
in Brown—and (1) find that Appellant was in fact denied conflict-
free and therefore effective legal representation below, (2) 
dismiss her conviction with prejudice and on the merits, (3) award 
attorneys fees to her "white knight" counsel, including the Utah 
Chapter of the ACLU, and (4) promulgate a "bright line" order which 
so clarifies the scope of Brown, and provides such meaningful 
remedies as requested above, that players in the criminal justice 
13 
system will no longer blatantly violate Brown and other Court 
mandates with impunity. / 
Respectfully submitted this /& 'day of ^K 
1994. 
R. CLAVtOlt'HUNTSMAN 
Attorney for 'Defendant and 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING 
On the /£/ daY o f MaY> 1994, I do hereby certify that I 
mailed a true and complete copy of the above and foregoing 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF by placing same in the United States Post 
Office, postage prepaid, to the following, to wit: 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ZT CLAYTOI 
Attorney/tor Appellant-Defendant 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
March 4, 1993 
The Hon. Russell Gallian 
The Hon* Jerry Lewis 
The Hon, Gayle Allred 
Washington County Commissioners 
Washington County Offices 
197 East Tabernacle 
St. Georgef Utah 84770 
Re: Provision of Independent Legal Counsel 
to Indigent Defendants in Washington County 
Dear Commissioners: 
I write to you regarding an issue of grave concern with 
regard to the County's statutory obligation to provide 
independent legal counsel for the representation of indigent 
defendants in criminal proceedings in Washington County, 
Utah. I have enclosed a copy of Ut. Code Ann. § 77-32-1 
(1953 as amended). You should especially note subsection 
four (sub-§ (4)) that the county shall "[ajssure undivided 
loyalty of defense counsel to the [indigent defendant] 
client." 
My understanding is that Washington County is and has 
been for some time, providing such legal services to 
indigents through contracts with three (3) individual 
attorneys, Douglas Terry, Esq., Jonathan Wright, Esq. and/or 
MacArthur Wright, Esq. 
I call to your attention a decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of State of Utah v. Donald Wayne Brown, 
Case No. 90-0148, P.2d , 201 Utah Adv.Rep. 4 (decided 
November 30, 1992); a copy is enclosed. 
The Brown case held that it was unquestionably improper 
and the basis for an automatic reversal of a criminal 
conviction if appointed legal counsel for an indigent 
defendant, i,e, a public defender, also concurrently serves 
as a prosecutor. Brown. P.2d , 201 Utah Adv.Rep. at 
7 - 8 (Utah 1992) . A copy of the decision in Brown is 
attached for your review. 
I have information that Douglas Terry, in addition to 
serving as one of the Washington County legal defenders is 
the City Attorney of LaVerkin, Utah, and serves in a 
prosecutorial function on behalf of that city* 
I have information Jonathan Wright and MacArthur Wright 
are law partners with Russell Gallian in the St. George law 
firm of Gallian, Westfall and Wilcox• I understand that 
Russell Gallian is the City Attorney of Ivins, Utah, and 
serves in a prosecutorial function on behalf of that city. 
And, of course, in addition, Russell Gallian as a County 
Commissioner has control over the legal defender contract 
and some input as to the conduct of the Washington County 
prosecutor. 
Rule 1.10 (a), Imputed Disqualification: General Rule, 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar 
provides: 
While lawyers are associated in a firm, 
none of them shall knowingly represent a 
client when any one of them practicing 
alone would be prohibited from doing so 
by Rules 1.7, • . • 
One of the basis for the Utah Supreme Court's decision 
in Brown were the considerations found in Rule 1.7 of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
My initial review of the foregoing indicates that every 
indigent defendant in Washington County that has been repre-
sented by Jonathan Wright, MacArthur Wright or Douglas Terry 
as legal defenders since November 30, 1992 and has plead 
guilty or has been found guilty after trial has the basis 
for a challenge to their conviction. Those challenges could 
take the form of an appeal or the form of a habeas corpus 
proceeding. 
In addition, each of those defendants has the basis for 
a civil rights (42 U.S.C. S 1983) action against Washington 
County for its failure to provide independent legal counsel 
as required by the United States Constitution and state law. 
Finally, it would appear that each such defendant could 
bring a malpractice action against these attorneys alleging 
violations of their rights and inadequate representation. 
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I bring this matter to your attention and asked that 
you take immediate action to assure all indigent defendants 
in Washington County adequate legal presentation in full 
compliance with the mandate of Brown and your statutory duty 
to provide "an attorney of undivided loyalty" to them. 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Attorney at Law 
BMB/pdq 
cc: 
Eric Ludlow, Esq* 
Washington County Attorney 
Jonathan Wright, Esq. 
MacArthur Wright, Esq. 
Douglas Terry, Est. 
Clayton Huntsman, Esq. 
Kathryn Kendell, Esq. 
A.C.L.U* 
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ATTACHMENT 2 
DOUGLAS D. TERRY 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone (801)628-4411 
Facsimile (801) 628-9260 
March 5, 1993 
Washington County Commissioners 
197 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Re: Washington County Indigent Defense Contracts 
Dear Commissioners: 
I have just received by facsimile a letter under the letterhead of ffUtah Legal Clinic" dated 
March 5, 1993, and signed by Mr. Brian M. Barnard. I believe the letter warrants my 
response. As you know, I have been under contract with Washington County for the 
representation of indigent defendants for a number of years. I have tried to perform my 
duties in that capacity in a professional and competent manner and have done my utmost 
to provide all of my-appointed clients with more than the constitutionally guaranteed 
representation. I take personal offense at Mr. Barnard's implied accusations that either 
myself, Jonathan Wright or J. MacArthur Wright have in anyway acted otherwise. 
It is true that I am under contract with the City of LaVerkin to act as their city attorney and 
have been so engaged for the last six years. However, LaVerkin City closed its justice court 
three years ago and since that time my contract with the city has included no prosecutorial 
responsibilities. Any criminal matters which occur within the City of LaVerkin are 
investigated by the Washington County Sheriffs Office and are referred to the Washington 
County Attorney's Office to be prosecuted in the Fifth Judicial District Court. In fact, there 
is an express agreement between myself and the City of LaVerkin that, due to my 
representation of indigent defendants, I cannot and will not prosecute any criminal cases. 
Like Mr. Barnard, I too am aware of the Brown case, however, my reading of the opinion 
appears to differ somewhat from his. It is true that under the ruling in Brown no attorney 
who has lf prosecutorial duties" can act as counsel for indigent defendants. The reasons set 
forth in the ruling are obvious. However, I find nothing in the opinion to suggest that the 
Utah Supreme Court meant to disqualify city attorneys with strictly civil law responsibilities 
from acting as criminal defense attorneys. The opinion contains no such language and I do 
not believe the ruling goes that far. Certainly, the policy consideration supporting the ruling 
do not have the same application with respect to a city attorney who does not prosecute any 
criminal cases. 
Page 2 
March 3, 1993 
I will continue to do my utmost to provide my indigent clients with adequate and 
independent legal representation and assure you that they will have my xmdivided loyalty. 
Should you have any questions at all concerning this matter please do not hesitate to contact 
me. 
DDTrdap 
pc: Eric Ludlow, Washington County Attorney 
J. MacArthur Wright 
Jonathan Wright 
Kathryn Kendell, ACLU (by facsimile) 
Brian M. Barnard 
Alan D. Boyack 
R. Clayton Huntsman 
I - /^UOLA5 u. TERRY 
1 5 0 N O R T H S E C O N D EAST, S U I T E 2 0 2 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
R* Clayton Huntsman 
2 West St. George Blvd. 
St, George, Utah 84770 
HAND DELIVERY 
ATTACHMENT 3 
Mj>iri/ 
R. CLAYTON HUNTSMAN - 1600 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
2 West St. George Boulevard 
Ancestor Square Tower Building - Suite 31 
P.O. Box 1425 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Tel: (801) 628-2846 
Fax No.: (801) 628-3049 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee ] 
vs. ] 
SONJA SWANSON 
Defendant and Appellant 
> SUGGESTION FOR TRANSFER 
) OF APPEAL TO UTAH 
l SUPREME COURT 
1 Appellate Court No. 
> 930160-CA 
Comes now defendant-appellant herein, Sonja Swanson, by and 
through her attorney of record, R. Clayton Huntsman, and 
respectfully moves the Utah Court of Appeals to consider 
transferring this case to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Reasons for this suggestion are set forth in defendant-
appellant's Docketing Statement, in §9, "Determination of Case by 
Supreme Court," on p. 13, as per Rule 9(c) (7) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
While technically this is simply an appeal from a final 
judgment involving plea and sentence on a second-degree felony, the 
basis and authority central to Appellant's position involve the 
constitutionally authorized inherent supervisory power over courts 
1 
and attorneys. Further, it appears from UTAH CONST. ART. VIII § 
that only the Supreme Court shall by rule "govern the practice of 
law". 
Integrated in this appeal is the scope of State v. Brown, 201 
Utah Adv. Rep.4 (1992) . The instant case thus presents or involves 
a substantial constitutional issue not yet fully decided and, to 
the extent decided to what extent compliance is expected by lower 
courts and others. Also, this case presents a substantial issue of 
first impression in the state and, most importantly of all, of 
substantial importance in the administration of justice—i.e., 
whether Brown conflicts apply to law partners, associates, office 
sharers, etc. or only to the individual attorney. 
Regardless of the outcome of this case in the Utah Court of 
Appeals, the case significance is such that it is highly likely 
that one side or the other will seek review by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Further, Appellant is supported by several who have 
expressed interest in being "Friends of the Court." 
Thus several good reasons appear in support of the Utah Court 
of Appeals' referring this case to the Utah Supreme Court for 
2 
ultimate determination. 
DATED this <~> day of , 1993 
CLAYTON ^ UNTSMAN 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE O 
On the J day of 
certify that I mailed a true 
SERVICE BY MAILING 
4sS 1993, I do hereby 
pd complete copy of the above and 
foregoing SUGGESTION FOR TRANSFER OF APPEAL TO UTAH SUPREME by 
placing same in the United States Post Office, postage prepaid, to 
the following, to wit: 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
R. CI^TOtf HUNTSMAN 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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ATTACHMENT 4 
\^ i l l ' 
7IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v, 
Sonja Swanson, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Utah Court of Aopeals 
KOV Q 3 t£23 
• j / - J;^ry T. Noonan 
ClifK of trja Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 930160-CA 
This matter is before the court on appellant's Suggestion 
for Transfer of Appeal to Utah Supreme Court. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a ruling on the suggestion for 
transfer is deferred pending completion of briefing in the case. 
Dated this^ 
BY THE COURT: 
#t day of November, 1993. 
Judith M . B i l l i n g s , Presiding a Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
'I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of November, 1993, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail to the party listed below: 
R. Clayton Huntsman 
Attorney at Law 
2 West St. George Boulevard, Suite 31 
P.O. Box 1425 
St. George, UT 84770 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
hand-delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney 
General's Office to be delivered to the party listed below: 
Jan Graham 
State Attorney General 
Governmental Affairs 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Dated this 3rd day of November, 1993. 
Deputy Clerk 
